By rat ifyin g th e K yoto Protocol, the European Uni on (E U) agr eed to redu ce e m issio ns of gr een ho use gases by R perc ent 111 the period 20 0R-20 12, co m pare d to 1990 levels. The m ain to o] th e EU has d eveloped in order to meet su ch require m e nt is th e Emission Trading Scho lle (E TS) . Th e EU ETS is a cap and trade syst em that affects m o re th an 40 per cent o f th e EU ca rbo n di oxid e emissions.
INTRODUCTION
This pap er propo siti on is to e xamin e th e nature , th e stru ctu re, and th e d e velopment of th e European Union Emission Trading Sc he me (E U ETS). Th e EU ETS allo ws a certain de g ree o f freed om for M ember States in o p e rating th e trading syste m. under th e su perv isio n o f th e E ur o pea n Co m m issio n (EC) . The core o f th e syste m is a di stributi on o f " righ ts to e m it carbo n d iox ide " , w h ic h ar e ca lled allo wa nc es, to selected activ ities across Eu ropean countri es.
The EU ETS is based on the rec ognitio n that, by c reating a pri ce for carbo n through th e establ ishme nt of a cap-and-t rade syste m and its rel ated m ark er , it w ill fo ste r th e m o st cos t-e ffective way for EU Member St at es to m eet th e ir Kyo to o bligatio ns a nd co m mi r to Eu ropean e nvironm e ntal-e n e rgy policies w h ic h 1I10 Ve toward s a lo w-carb on and e ne rgy efficient so cie ty in the future. The EU ETS is a sim ple and cos t effec tive ap proac h to e missi o n red u ct io n and is fully integrated in the single market lo gic o f th e EU becau se it establishes l sin gle market for carbon allowances. In what foll ows, I wi ll ex e m p lify th e stru ctur e of the syste m , describing the scheme development p ro cess and its fram ewo rk, and give proini-
The European Union Emission Trading Scheme nence to its main featur es and I w ill also dr aw so m e co nclusio ns on its efficac y .
HISTORY
The environm ental policy of the European Union is quite n ew wh en co m pared to o t he r policies. In fa ct, th e Treaties of Rome in 19 57 do not mention th e e nv iro nm e n t at all. Lat er decade s dr ew atte ntio n to a new imminenr p roblem: climate change . In late 1973 the EU end o rsed its first e n viro n m e ntal actio n, th e En vironmental Acti on Pro gram , to offset possible nati onal poli ci es to become barri e rs o n building th e common market and to fost er the e nvi ro n me nt as th e basis of ec on omi c and so c ial de velopment.' Th e fIrst com p re he nsive an d detail ed Treat y, w h ich addresses e nv ir o nm e ntal poli cy, wa s th e Sing le European Act in 19~6. The E U wa s g ive n responsibility ov e r new areas su ch as th e e n viro nm e nt , and it made environm ental pr otection a required co m po ne n t of all EU poli ci es. Th e e nviromuent sectio n of th e Treaty calls for the-Community to take actions relating to th e environment to the extent to whi ch objectives like improving its quality, protecting human health, and rati onal uti lizati on o f natural resourc es can be att aine d bette-r at C o m m un ity rather than nati onal le vel. This is w itho ut Jeopardizin g th e M ember States' co m pe te nce to negotiate in internati onal bodi es and to co ncl ude international agree me nts . M oreo ver, in co ns ide ring acti ons, "the environmental dmllllj!c should as II priority Vi' r{'(([ticd at source, and that the polluter should pay". The co nce pt ofsustain.rb iliry w ill be included lat er in th e M aastri cht ( l992) and Arnstcrdarn (1997) Treati es.
In this context and in urging acti o ns o n con trasting climate cha nge , th e Joint Ener gy Environm ent C o un cil (1990) proposed to stabilize EU-15 carbon d io xid e (C 0 2) emissions at 1990 lev els by 20 0 0 2 A first proposal ab o u t a C 0 2 tax was dr aft ed in 1992; although it was withdra wn five ye ars later. D espite thi s failure , the s.une yea r wa s th e inception of a g lo bal con u n in n e n r o n climate cha nge: Th e United Nations Organi zati on under the Framewo rk Conve ntio n o n C lim ate C ha nge (U N FCC C ) in vol ved 16 0 parti es e nd o rsing to adopt glo bal agree m ents o n climate issues. The C o nv e ntio n is com posed o f th e-Co n fere nc e of the Parties (CO P) w hic h includes all th e co u ntries that are Parti es to th e Convent io n. The third COP ad opte d th e K yoto Proto col in th e ye ar 1997, w hic h be cam e th e m o st impo rtant document e ver dr afted on climate chan ge . Its implications, both politi cal and technical, have been trem endou s in th e past decade and ar e still the baseline for future ne gotiations. The K yot o P roto col includes m ore bind ing requirements fo r th e C o u n tries listed in the Anne x I (ind ustria lized countri es) , w hic h th e EU is part of. A rt. 11 states that those co u nt rie s must assist and provide fina nci al a nd technologi cal resou rces to d ev eloping co untri es, in o rde r to h elp them ad van ce with th e implementati on of e xis ting co m m i tme nts. The Proto col intends to pro mote suc h a harm oni ous developm ent through three flexibl e mechanism s.,\ Fir st, th e Protocol allow s e m issio n trading as a way of ge ne rating tradabl e carbo n cre d its: a C<lp and trad e syste m. Art. 17 defines th e e m issio n trading and it is th e syste m by w hich the d ev eloped co u nt ries acquire e m issio n units from other develo ped co un tries . Seco nd, th e J oint Impl em entati on 01) as defi ned in th e Art. 6 of the Pro to col allows co u n tries under K yoto co m m itm e n ts to tak e part in th e e m issio ns redu cti on pr oj e ct in o the r countri es w h ic h a re under Kyot o co n u n in u c n rs to o . A n Anne x I CO llIltry is allo w ed to fina nce a proj ect in ano t her Annex l coun try o bta ining http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/10 redu cti ons u nits d ispo sable to co m ply w it h its Pr ot ocol requi rem ents. Thi rd . th e C lean Developm en t Mec ha n ism (C D M ) gi ves a to ol to help Annex I part ies achi evin g co mp liance w ith th eir stricte r co nu ui u ne nrs and let developing co u nt ries be assisted fro m project resulting in ce rtified em issio ns red uc tio n. An Ann ex I country is allowed to fin ance a p roj ect in a non An nex I country w hic h ratified the Protocol , o btainin g reducti o ns units d ispos able to com ply wit h its Protocol requirem en ts.
Th e Kyoto Proto col is th e m ilestouc of the d evelo pm ent of th e Eu rop ean U n io n Emission Trade Sc he me . The Euro pea n Un io n has be en the g reatest supporter o f the Protocol and II ,IS been d eveloping ,I series of ag ree me n ts and actions in o rde r to co mp ly w ith its req uir em en ts. These action s occ urr ed ill part be fo re th e E U ratified th e Kyo to Pro to co l in th e year 2002 . Aft er th e adopti o n o f th e third COP . t he EU decide d to rea llo cate th e em ission red uctio ns quotas of ea ch Mem ber State un d er t he Bur de n Sh aring agre em en t (BSA) in the year 1998. The BSA was reaffirmed by joint ratifica tio n of the Kyo to Protocol in 2002 , wh er e it became a bi nd in g int ernational law. Th e BSA w as made considering co st effici en cy and eq uity as baselin e o f its settlem ents. T his led to very different q uotas ;1I1101I g the EU m ember states: m ore st ringe nt target s were assign ed to Ge rm any and UK whi le so m e co untries were even allowed to inc rease th eir emi ssio ns."
Later in the year 2000 rhe E U bunch ed th e Europ ean C lima te C ha nge Prograuu nc (E C CP) , The go,d o f th e EC CP is to id ent ify and de velop all necessary element s of an EU stra tegy to Impleme nt th e Ky oto Pro tocol. The de velo pm en t of th e first EC CP in vo lved all of the rele vant groups of stak eho lders working to gether, incl udi ng rep resen tat ives trout t he C o mmissio n 's different departm ents (D C s), the M ember Sta tes , industry and en viro n m ent al gr o up s. T he seco nd EC C P starte d III th e year 2005 and focused Oil several w ork ing gro u ps, one o f w hich was d ed icated to a rev iew o f th e E TS.
The idea o f d evelop ing all em issio n tradin g syste m to co m ply w ith th e Kyoto COIlImirmer u s came w ith th e Crccu Paper "n C HC Emi ssion Trading (20 00). T he in cep tion o f th e E U ETS to o k place altho ug h t he EU W,IS fo rm er ly stro n gly o pposed to e missio n tradin g d uri ng the int ernati o nal negoti at ion in Kyo to ." The EU ETS is a result of th e Kyo to Protocol. However it is im plem ented throu gh E ur o pean law s ind ep endently o f it . Its fun ction is also to facilitat e o ther act io ns like self-conu niun e nts of the EU : th e 20-2 0-2U pa ct, w h ich sets targets on en er gy an d -20 percent C02 emissio ns (1990 baselin e) w ithin the yea r 202 0 amo ng th e Europea n Conu u unity, is based o n E U ETS. The ETS has already ex perim e nte d its first P hase and it is n o w run n ing th e seco nd , th e o ne un der the Kyoto co nuni n ne n rs. Its ro le as th e big gest wo rldw ide tool on C02 emiss ions red uct io n is go ing to in fluence future ne gotiatio ns o n th e post Kyot o actio ns w h ich are set CO be acc o illplishe d in the C o pen hagen COP later in 2U09.
DRIVERS
There are several feat ur es w h ic h characterize t he EU ETS and m ake it a particul ar case of emission tradi ng. T he curre nt framew or k IS the ou tc o m e of politi cal, iustirutio nal, and private pre ssures and ba rgaining. It is di fficu lt to u nd erstand the exa ct dyn am ic dr iv ing each fea tur e. but it is possib le to sho w w h ich are th e prin ciples that sup po rt th e EU E TS.
First of all th e EU ETS is an " add 0 11" syste m and is th er efor e co mpatible w ith w hat m ost Euro pea n co u ntrie s used to comm it to th e Kyo to Pro to col. Each M embe r State sha ll
The European Union Emission Trading Scheme co n u n u n icate to the European Com m issio n (E C) th e amount of C 0 2 eq u iv ale n t e m issio ns reduction co ining from internal polici es o t he r than th e EU ETS . Thi s is a favorabl e feature to go ve rn me n ts and their acti ons becau se they have control over th ei r industri es. Another important feature is that an e m issio n tradin g is a system that do es n ot undermin e the environrnenral obj ecti ve , since the overall amount of all owances is fixed (i.e. th e total EU ETS C02 emi ssions cap is ultimatel y d ecided by th e EC ) . Rather, it e n a b les cost-effe ctiv e implementati on of the ov e rall target and provides in centives to in ves t in en viroumentallv so u n d techn ol o gi es. Thi s m akes a ETS J safe w,ly to com plv with th e Kyoto commitments.
The ke y eco no mi c rati onale behind emissions tr ad in g is to use market m e chanisrus to e ns u re that e m issio ns redu cti ons required to achieve a pre-determin ed environmental outco me take place w h ere th e co st of redu cti on is th e lo w est . Furthe rm o re , emissions tradin g induces competition betwe en companies to fmd co st-effective wa ys to redu ce th eir emissio ns , and ad d it io nal boost is given to c uv iro n m c n tally friendly techn ologies." Th e intention is to ensure that the EU ETS results in redu ctions in e m issio ns which are additi onal to those that are alread y provid ed fo r by Conununi ry le gi slati on on ren ewable enerb'Y in e le c tricity production. "
Althou gh there are n o major applications of tr adable allowan ces under EU environm ental poli cy, th e con cept o f tradable allo w an ces is n ot totally unfamiliar in th e European Com m u n ity . The quotas for Ozone D epleting Substances unde r th e Montreal Protocol is o ne exampl e and the form er su ccessfu l ex pe rie nce de rivi n g from th e US with su lp hu r di o xid e emissions trading is an other one. "
The EU ETS is impl em ented at th e European level: it is a common system to the 27 EU Member States . A p olitical driv er to the reali zation of a co mm o n EU m embers ETS is the group o f European In stitutions. In fact the EU is not onl y a g ro u p of co u n tries participating in a set framew ork, it is also a su p ranatio na l institution w it h its ow n offices and jurisdiction ove r some issu es. Consequ ently one p oint of view ab o u t the EU ETS boo st com es from th e proper EU instituti o n s. Sin ce the T reaties of R om e there h as b e en a calling for a comm on mark et as a ba silar ste p to wards integration . It 's n ot su rp ris ing that the EU institutions are encouraging a res olutio n at an EU level of the K yoto commitment.
The EU has a particular character, st ill not full y .rccouutable to citizens an d so to th ei r o p in io n or co nse n su s, but st ro n gly st ru ct u red and m ade out of technical groups. This helped th e EU ETS to be fost ered , since it met man y effi ci en cy requirem ents, compatible with th e idea of a co u u n on m arket and in cr easin g integrat ion . The Gre en Paper on G H G Emission Trading hi ghlights th e se facts menti oning man )' features that a ETS at th e Eu ropean lev el might b e th e best way to co m p ly with the Kyoto Protocol. The free market ha s made busin ess eas ily impl emented at European lev el so that m an y com pan ies operate no w ad ays in different EU M ember States; when companies w ere o pe ra ting within national bord e rs some d ecad es ago. Therefore it 's lik el y that compan ies p referred a EU-wide ETS to 27 individual ETS. A Conununiry emissions trading sch eme leads to o ne single pri ce for allowanc es traded by com p an ies w i th in the sch eme, while different un conn ected nati onal sc he mes w ould result in different prices within each nati on al sc heme an d http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/10 consequentl y to~~di stortion of th e Eu rop ean market.
Activiti es w hic h account for th e major share of th e EU ETS are those relat ed to energy , and th er efore power plants are pla ying a central ro le. The electricity secto r h~IS been hi stori cally natio n alized. but In th e past 20 years there has been a progressive Iiber alization of th e secto r. Th is is th e co nseq ue n ce o f bo th a politi cal pr essure at the Europ ean leve l In order to co m ply wit h a co n u no n free m ark er and a techni cal c ho ice to fo ster e ne rg y effic ie nc y. Jn (ICt, nat ionaliz ati on has helped to build a so lid po wer plant and electri cal syste m framework but has not been able to maximi ze efficie ncy as th e lib eralization of th e m ark et is likel y to do. Consequ entl y. the energy sector has been developin g knowledge and att itude to work in a mark et regim e. The EU ETS co m es as the main sec to r involved in it and has already d e veloped to o ls to tackl e a m arket regim e. This is likel y to b e a prevailing reason why the E U ETS Iu s been e ndo rsed .
Gua rantees o f co m petitive ness, po oling co uu u itrn e nt, a nd a pilot ph ase have been add ressed in th e EU ETS to respo nd to c rit ical bu siness issues. This is link ed to a national role of allo cati on managem ent , ( Ivo ra ble to both ind ivid ual gov ern m e nts fo r th e cr iti cal importan ce o n being responsible for the allocati on p ro cess, and busin ess whi ch has more possibility to co nd itio n a nati on al le vel allowances di stribution.
Fin ally Th e inclusion o f] 1 and above all of CDM cr ed its in the EU ETS w ere fostered by acti viti es in vol ved in th e ETS since the y represent an o p po rtu ni ty to o b tain cheaper cred its from proj ects. The European C o mm issio n must ve rify these credits in o rde r to addOIl to nati onal c red its. Busin esses' soc ial resp onsibili ty and e nv iro nme ntal performance play a strategi c ro le in the de velopment o f flexible m ech ani sm s. Th e Emissio ns Trading D irective is the c ha rte r th at pro vides th e legal foundati on for the EU ETS. The European Com m issio n first publi sh ed a draft proposal in Oc to b er 200 1, which w as fo rm ally enacted in O cto ber 2003: th e C rCCtI Paper 011 CH C Eniission TrarlinJ: . Sin ce it w as drafted there has been mu ch discussion o ve r the developm ent o f the EU ETS. The tw o yea rs th at se parate th e fIrS t pr op osal from th e d efiniti ve e ndo rse m e nt we re chara cteri zed by c ha nge o ve rs betw een th e European Parliament and Coun cil. Am endm ents in th e two years be twee n the fonnal draft prop osal and its fin al e nac tme nt were add ed as rep orted in th e do cu me nts availabl e at til e EC e n viro n m e n t D G . The release o f th e propos ed E U Directive o n GHC emissi ons trading in October 200 1 initiated th e co -decisio n process, wh er eby th e European Parli am ent and the Europ ean Council w ould share together th e inst itu tio nal powe r the y h old . Th e first reading of th e proposal took pla ce in the Europ ean As th e K yoto Proto co l pro vides, the flexibl e m ech anisms play an imp ortant roleon th e
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The E U ETS IS a cap an d trad e' system. T he o verall cap o n em issio ns is fixe d an d div id ed am on g its participants. The system p ro vid es the possibiliry for the existen ce o f marke t plat forms in o rde r to facilitate trade among part icip ant s. E very parti cipant has to co m ply w ith its emissio ns cap (i.e. the req uireme n t o n its total C02 em issio ns), w h ic h is represented by assign ed allowances o n emiss io ns. O ne allo wance gives th e hold er the righ t to emit o ne to n ne of C0 2. Th ese allo wanc es arc the comm on tra di ng 'c urrency' at the h eart o f th e system : part icipa nts ar e allow ed to trad e o ff th ei r allowa nces as lon g as they respect their cap . Allowan ce s are ce n tral to th e E U ETS as th e y a re th e measur e of the em issio ns, and its numb er is o ne of the key d et e rin inants of th e pri ce in the market.
The system was o riginally di vided into two phases. T he first on e , kn own as pi lot ph ase , took place betwee n 2005-2007 . T he seco nd is now In place and follows the Ky o to 2008-20 12 tim e pe riod. C u rre nt ly, eve ry M em ber State shall presen t to th e Eur op ean C o mmission , fo r eac h trading period u nde r th e sche me , a nati ona l alloca tion plan (NAP). T h is do cu me nt de te rmines to tal lev els o f ETS em issio ns an d how m an y em issio n allowances e.nh installati on wi th in the country recei ves eac h year. At th e end of each year installations mu st sur re nde r allowances equi valent to th eir em issio ns. Com panies th at keep th eir em issio ns belo w th e level of th eir allo wances are in a lon g position an d can se ll th e surp lus of allo wances. Those wh i ch are emitting more th an allowed are in a short pos itio n and can bu y allo wance s o n th e market. Th e cho ice of recu rri ng to th e market rather than to investing ill self-co mpliance are l ikely to he d erermi ned by relat ive cos ts. In fact, th e ultimat e go al of th e E U ETS is to reach red uc tion s in th e m ost cost effective way. Com mi ssio n stud ies ha ve co ncluded t hat th e targets can be ach ieved at an an n ual cos t of€2.9 to €3 .7 billio n , w hich is less th an 0 .1 % of GDP of th e EU . O ne of th ese studies co ncluded that withou t th e Emissio ns T rading Scheme cos ts co uld rearh €(d l hi llio n . Emi ssion tradi ng thus allows the cos ts of Kyoto to he redu ced .
PARTICIPANTS AND CAPS
T od ay th e E U ETS Includ es the parti cipati on o f all th e E U -27 M emb er States (Roman ia an d B ulgari a joined in 2007) ,IS wel l as Ice lan d , Liechtenstein , and N orw ay (2008) w hich are not E U m embers . T he D irective 20OJ/l'l 7/ EC e nac ted t he E U ETS, spec ifying tile sector s invol ved in the cap and trad e system . An nex I of th e d irec tive exe m plifies th e acti vities in vol ved w hic h are rep o rted in the T able 1.1 . So m e m or e activities, w h ich are not includ ed in Ta ble 1.1, were adde d with th e hegi n n ing o f seco nd phase .
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/10 Installati o ns for the product io n o f pig iro n or steel (primary o r secondary Ca rbon di ox ide fusion ) incl ud ing continu o us casting, wi th a capacity exc eeding 2.5 ron nes pe r ho ur
Mincra! il/llu.'/I')'
Installatio ns fo r th e producti on ofce mc nr clinke r in rot ary kilns wit h a proCarbon diox ide d ucr io n capacity e xceed ing 500 ro n nes per day o r lillie in rot ary kilns w ith a production capacity ex ceeding 50 ronnes per day o r in o ther IiI m aces wi th a prod ucti on capac ity exceeding 50 ro nues per da y Installations for the manufactu re o f glass including glass fibre with a llleiting Carb on dioxide cap aci ty ex ceeding 20 ronues per day Installation s for the manut actu re of ce ramic produ cts by firing. in particular Ca rbon diox ide roo fing tiles. bricks. refr acto ry bricks, tiles. sto new are o r po rcelain. wi th a pro d ucti on capac ity exceed ing 75 ron nes per day, and / or wi th ;l kiln capacity ex cee d ing -l Ill; and w ith a se tt ing den sity per kiln ex ceedi ng JOO kg/ Ill' Cnhcr artirisic, Indu str ial plan ts for the producti on of Carbo n d io xid e (a) pu lp from timb er o r o ther fibro us mate rials (b) paper and hoard w ith a pr od uct io n capacity ex ceedi ng 20 tou nes per da y Carb o n d ioxide
Source: Directive 2003/ 8 7/Ee
T able 1.1 cl ea rly shows h o w th e E U E TS ta rg et s th os e activitie s w hi ch result in massive e m issions. This is the fun d am ental c ri te ria o n whet her to assign com p lia nce reglllrem e nts to co m pa nies or n o t. T he point regardi ng e ne rgy ac t iv it ies incl ud es el ectric ity a n d h eating produ c ti o n . These a re th e bulk of th e E U ETS sin ce t he y are ca rbo n inten sive em itte rs and installatio ns b igger than 20 M W cover a ve ry lar ge sh are ofE uropean elect rici ty an d he:lting produ ct io n . O t he r activities In T a ble 1.1 , suc h as pro du ct io n o f m et als, a re ve ry intensive emitte rs for t h e pa rt ic u la r manu fac t urin g process, Other ind u stri es, suc h as cem ent facto ries, re sult in large e m issio ns for th ei r c he m ica ls. The participat ion is ultimately defin ed at E u ro pea n le vel b y th e E C Di recti ve 2003/ R7 , b ut so m e e xcepti o ns ar e allo w ed : in particular cases, so me activ ities unde r th e EU ETS co u ld not be constrai n ed to a ny r eq u ire me n t even th ough th e y a re part o f t he activ it ies listed in T ab le 1.1,
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Transportation as we ll as residen tial-h ou seh old . resulting in diluted emissio ns, is co mpletely neglected despite th e fact th at em issio ns con ring fro m tra nspo rtati on are not negligible at all. In the EU , tra nspo rt is resp on sible for 2] per cent of EU gr eenhou se gas emi ssion s, hou seh olds and sm all b usinesses for 17 percent and agri culture for 10 percent.
The o t her fu nd .un enr al poin t is th e cap . Th e ove rall E U cap abo ut G H G s emissio n redu cti on s is eq ual to th e EU co nuu irm eut under th e Kyot o Proto col. T Ilt' E U ETS cap is a " cap w ithi n th e cap" , assigned to the trading secto r co nsidering th e 200~-201 2 ph ase." In fact th e Kyoto co m mi tme n ts are not tiJlJy und er the E U ETS but also unde r th e nontradin g secto rs whi ch eve ry member state must ex empli fy in its nat ion al rep or ts (Na tion al Allo cati on Plans).
An other important issue is how man y allowances are distributed amo ng the acti viti es: th e crite ria her e is based o n the abate me nt po ssibiliti es o f eac h activity inclu d ed . The o utco me is that th e e nergy secto r accounts for th e m ain share o f emissio ns red uc tio ns. Under th e E U E T S, abou t 11,500 energy -int en sive plants across th e EU-27 are to day able to b uy and sell permits to emi t carbo n di oxid e, representing aro und 45 per cent o f the EU 's to tal C02 em issio ns (or abo ut 30 per cent o f its o ve rall G H G em issio ns) Y This point, the d istrib u tio n alllo ng activi ties, reveals a parti cu lari ty o f the EU ETS. The o vera ll cap is d efin ed b y th e Com mi ssio n w hich d etain s ultimat ely th e po wer to accept th e distr ibution o f allowa nc es. H o wever, th e distri buti on is left to th e M embe r States : each one has the respo nsibility to allo cate allo w ances am ong national activities. This du alism is a parti cular feature o f th e EU ETS when co m pared to othe r emissi on trading system s. The Com m issio n's decision s on th e nati on al allo cat io n plans for the Phase II am o u n ted to 2083 m illion to n nes per yea r foll o win g th e d ecision o f th e Cou rt o n th e Slova k plan, whi ch d efinitively set th e Slova kia Ph ase II cap . T abl e 1.2 sho ws th e total amo un t o f alloc at io n in th e N ati onal Allocati on Plans (N A Ps). Each Memb er States was assigned a spe cific emissions cap bo th III Phas e I and " . Ali of th e Phase " caps result ed stricter th an th ose of Pha se I, and al most all o f th e cap th at Member States proposed for Phase II were m odified by th e C ornmi ssion to wards bigger stringency (except De nm ark , France , Slov eni a, and UK's pr op osed http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/10 1. The figu res indica ted in this col um n comp rise em issio ns in installat io ns th at com e under th e cove rage of th e sche m e ill 2008 to 2012 du e to all ext ended scope appli ed by the member state dud do not includ e new installatio ns e nte ring the sche me in secto rs alread y covered ill th e first trad in g period .
TIME PERIODS STRUCTURE
The E U ETS wa s first cre ated to help EU Member States to co nu n it to th e Kyoto Protocol. It IS therefore reaso nable that a EU ETS Pha se co inc ide s w ith Kyo to Prot oc ol co mmittin g period . The ex iste nce of a pil ot Phase to prep are the EU M emb er The struct u re of the Ph ases in terms of o bliga tio ns and pr escription o f regulati on s is th e sam e, except fo r so m e d eta ils (e. g. penalti es: 40 Eu ro for each not returned allo wan ce under the first ph ase, 100 Euro und er the second). M ore activities w er e co m pelled to co m ply with the EU ETS: among th ese a re Glass, Mineral W ool, Gypsum, Petrochemicals (cracke rs), Carbo n Blac k , Integrat ed Stee lw o rks, Flaring fro m o ffsho re o il and gas produ cti on . M oreover, th e Linking Directi ve ad ded a ne w cr ite rio n . This requi res each plan to state h o w man y cred its fro m JJ and C O M proj ects, th ose plants cove red by th e allo ca tio n plan , are permitted to sur re nd er for co m plian ce in the seco nd trading period .
C 0 2 emissions o f th e activities und er the EU ETS ha ve risen b y 1.9 pe rcent w ithi n th e Ph ase 1, well belo w th e EU GOP grow t h .l~For th e seco nd trading peri od th e Cornmissio n has ca pped nat ion al e m issio ns from EU ETS sect o rs at an average of aro u nd 6.5 percent below 200 5 le vels to help e ns ure th at th e EU as a whole, an d Member States individually, deliver o n th eir Kyot o co n u n itm e nrs. T o d o th at o pe rato rs a re glo bally allowed to import up to 1,'0132 milli on cred its durin g Pha se [I. ln a pr elim ina ry but d et ailed an alysis o f thi s dat a, Ellerm an and Bu chner (20 08) conclud ed th at a reasonab le estim ate of th e red uctio n in C0 2 http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/10 emissions attri butable to the EU ETS lies betwe en 50 an d 100 milli on ton s for eac h ye ar , o r between 2.5 p er cent and 5 per cent from what emissions would hav e be en without th e EU ETS . Thi s is an important reductio n , co nsid e ring that e n viro n m e n tal policies have nev er produced suc h a reducti on be fo re .
More di scu ssion is tak in g pl ace ab out th e next P hase. In fact th e EU ETS is going to be th e to ol to cor n u u t wi th th e Euro pean de veloped 20-20-20 Each nation has d e veloped regi stries an d has g ive n authority to its state appar atu s in order to achieve ,1 complet e fra mewo rk w h ic h wo u ld fo llow th e regulati ons created b y the NAP . A ctually, Membe r Sta res are periodi call y required to d ra w up the ir NAP well in advanc e o f eac h ETS trading peri od and to have it ap p ro ved by th e European Commission . D ea dlin es n eed to be resp ect ed so th at th e Com m issio n makes d ecisions o n all th e N APs a nd Mem b er Sta tes can tak e th e ir final allocati on dec isions well b efo re th e trading p er iod start s. Consequ ently, the Commission must make a decis io n on each NAP w ithi n three m onths o f th e NAP h aving been n otified to it. M em b er S tates have t w o o p tio n s on how to di stribute allowan ces: free of cha rge or by auc t io ni ng. Article 10 o f th e D irec tive 200 3/ R7/E C sti p ula tes that fo r the fir st an d seco n d trading period Member Sta te s must allo cat e at lea st 9 5 percent resp ecti vel y 90 perce nt o f th e allo w an ces fre e of ch ar ge . D ur ing th e fir st tra d in g peri od , M ember States aucti on ed o n ly very limit ed quantities of allow an ces. For t h e seco n d trading p eriod , still the lion 's sh are o f allowan ces has been all o cat ed for free, alth ou gh so m e w h at m ore sig n ific an t quantities have be en au ctio ned . The n ext p hase, starting in 2013, is going to m ark a turning p oint sin ce th e Com m issio n states th at auctio ni ng o f all o w an ces is going to b e th e rule rath er th an the ex cepti on .
The process o f e ndorse ment o f th e NAPs exe m p lifies th e ultimate decisional p o w er o f th e C o m mis sio n . If th e Co m miss io n do es no t reject any asp ect o f <l NAP , th e M ember State
The European Union Emission Trading Scheme can mak e a final decision o n th e allocation to ind ividual install ati on s. If th e Commi ssion finds th at a NAP is not in lin e with the agreed cr ite ria or with th e EU Treaty it can reject it parti ally or in fuU. A rej ecti on o f a national allo catio n plan m eans th at the Member State ma y not pr oceed in implementing th e plan as it stands (i.e . ma y no t alloc ate the number o f propo sed allo w anc es) . Th e C om m issio n mu st give its reaso ns for rejecting a NAP, and th ese r e~I S 0 1lS give gui da nce on ho w Membe r States can mak e the plan co m patib le wi th th e allocati on cr ite ria.
If M ember States wh ose plans have been partially rejected impl em ent the pr op osed changes th ey d o not hav e to subm it their plans to the Commissi on a secon d time but can pro ceed in taking their fin al alloca tio n de cisio n. After receivin g th e C omm issio n 's app rova l a Member State has to pr oceed to ma ke a final alloca tio n decision at th e nati ona l level. Be fore do ing so, it can make chan ges to th e number of allowan ces for indi vidual plants as a result of impro ved data , (e .g, if histori c emissio ns data are used for a plant-l evel allocatio n formul a. o r to increase th e percentage of allo w an ces that it will auctio n).
O nc e th e final allo cation decision has bee n made at th e national level and the final plan is pu bli shed, no m ore cha ng es (known as " ex-post adju snu enr s") to the number o f allo wa nc es in total o r per pla nt can be m ad e in th e national alloca tio n plan. In fact , th e C ommission is bound to ac t in acco rdance w ith its o bligatio ns un der the Treaty in view of safegua rd ing fair co m petitio n and freed om o f cstablish me u r w ith in the int ernal m ark et and ex-po st adj ustme nt s are iucoinpatible w it h th e legal fram ew ork becau se the y represent interventi ons that disrupt th e market and cr eate uncertainty fo r co m panies. For ex am ple , if a compan y faces the p ossibility that the gov e rnm ent may tak e away allowances after it has redu ced its em issio ns, It w ill hesitate to do so .
DISTRIBUTION OF ALLOWANCES
Art icle 11 (4) of th e Di rec tive 2003 /8 7 / EC do es not specify th e proportion o f allo wan ces w hic h Member States are to issue eac h ye ar. In tlCt, M ember States sho uld have th e flexi bility to issue highe r p roportion of allo wan ces In the fir st yea rs of the period if th ey so wi sh . Annu al issuin g. in co nj unct io n with an n ual surrendering. sh o u ld ensure th at o pe rato rs kee p a goo d understanding o f th eir em issio n s trajectory. This w o u ld avoid th e o cc urr ence o f pri ce sp ikes at th e en d o f the 3 o r 5 years peri od . The qu antit y o f allo wan ces a M ember State ma y issue is go verned by th e 11 C rite ria specified in th e Annex III o f th e Directi ve 2003lH7l Ee. Amon g th ese are: me eting th e EU 's and M ember States' Kyo to co run u tm ents,~lC tu a ] verified em issio ns reported in th e Commission 's an nua l progr ess repo rts, and th e technological potenti al for reducing em issio n s. The Emissions Trading Directi ve does not ex plicitly pre scrib e a give n number of allowances. but eac h M ember State 11l1lSt respect th e crite ria. The wa y by w hich allo w an ces are allocated is a kind of reiterati on between go ve rnm en t and ind ustries co nside ring th e d ata provided by th e latt er.
All ame -nd ment to th e ETS Directi ve (i.e . the Linking Di recti ve), allows com pa nies in th e second trading period to usc credits from JI and th e C D M , up to a certain p ro port io n o f th eir alloc atio n of emission allow an ces in o rde r to cover th ei r em issio ns. T he d egr ee of use must be sup p lem en tal to re d uctio ns achi ev ed through dom estic policy action . It also needs to be fix ed by each M ember State in its NAP by specifymg th e maximum am ount o f such cre d its. M ember Stat es are free to choose whe the r to app ly th e limit individu ally in respect to each insrallati on , or co llec tively to all in stallati ons. For g rea te r flexi bility, th e C om m issio n is recom m e nd ing th at M ember States appl y the limit for th e e nt ire tradi ng period and http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/10 co llec tively to all insta llatio ns. It is inte resting to note th at , alt ho ug h th e easte rn Europ ean M ember Star es are incl ude d in th e A nn ex J co un tries of the C o nve nt ion (UN FC CC) , th ey don' t need parti cul ar m easures in o rder to co m m it to any Kyoto rcqu ircmcurs. In t;lCl, th e ir actual e miss io ns arc mu ch lo wer th an in I')l) (), since em issio ns decreased in th e first half of th e 1990s d ue to th e economic n-struct ur ing in Eastern E uro pe. T he pos sib ility o f di stortion s ill th e EU ET S m ark et when easte rn M ember St ates we re allow ed to d istribute free amo u nts ofallo wan ces. is a major issue . In o rde r to avoid th is, the EC set ,I cap in their NAPs co nsid ering t he bus iness as usual ex pec tatio n on th ose co u ntries. The ou tco me of allo wa nces d istrib u tio n in th e firs t ph ase, as show n in th e Figure 1 .1 , is th at th e elec tric ity utility sector assumed a net sho rt positi o n w hen the o ther industria l activities w e re ne t long . In additi on , Figure 1 . 1 hi ghli ghts ho w t he m ark et vo lu me was co n ce nt rated w ithi n th e energy secto r. T he allo w an ces di stributi on crea te d both a long and sho rt gross position ac ro ss the variou s E uro pean inst allati ons, wh ose final tr ade off o utco me w as a enert-'J' sector n et shor t po siti on . All of th e o th e r indu stri al activi ties u nd er the E U ETS resulted in a net long positio n . 
ALLOWANCES TRADE OFF
Each M ember Sta re mu st a rra ng e ad m inist rative ar ra ngement and issue authori ryfies) to co m ply wi th th e D irective 2lJ03 /H7 /EC . Amo ng th ese. arrange m ents o n th e issu e of regis ters sets an acc ura te accou nt ing o f th e holding, transfe r and cancellati on of allo w an ces, T h is regis try system is sepa rate from trad ing activity since not all trades res ult in changes ill o w ner ship of allowan ces. However , w here a trade c ulm inates in a c ha nge in o wn er ship , a transfe r o f allowan ces bet ween acc ou nts in the regi stry systelll is ma de . Both th e govc rrune nr. hy th e appoi n ted a uthori ty . and each pe rson w ho det ain s allowa nces sha ll kee p
The European Union Emission Trading Scheme track of holding, tran sfer, and cancellatio n in co m pliance with the Directive 2003187l Ee.
Alth ou gh an y third party can bu y and sell allowanc es, they first need to ope n an acco unt anywhere in an EC registry. B y creating an elec t ro nic database , the C ommission ensures that th ere arc no transfers incompatibl e with o bligatio ns resulting from th e Kyo to Protocol. To do thi s the Comm issio n designated a Ce nt ral Administrator to maintain an ind ep endent transaction log recording the issue, transfer, and can cellation of allowances and checking the regist ers of each Member State." The outcom e is a connectio n of all the nation al registers under th e Com m unity Independent Transacti on Lo g (CITL) which provides alloca tio n and emissions dat a at th e in stallation level. Moreover , a recent achievement sees the co nnec tio n of the CITL and M ember State registries with the UNFCCC luternational Tran saction Log (ITL), be en co m pleted on October 16, 2008. 17 The Directi ve 2003l87/ EC does not mention th e establishme nt o f an y marketplaces.
The leg,11 fram ework of the trading sche me does not regulate how and where th e m ark et in allowances take s place . C om panies with co mmitments may trade allo wan ces directly with each o the r, o r they lllay huy or sell via a broker , bank or other market int erm edi ary , The exist en ce of stock markets is therefore th e o utco m e of the willingness of som e participants of the EU ETS. 
EU ETS NEW ENTRANTS -CLOSURES l 9
The provi sion s about new entrants and possible closures are another distin gui shin g mark of the EU ETS com paring to other trading schemes. Their accomplishment is th e offshoot of politi cal pr essure of the governments towards the EC to safeguard indu stry investments and m aintaining plants within the nation . The outco m e is usually a free allo wa nce distribution to new entrants and withdrawal of allowances from any facility that shuts do wn .
The first ph ase saw a reservation on allowan ce to new entrants of 195 tons o n em issio ns, that is equ al to abo ut 3 percent of the total. The distribution of these has been regulated mostly on a " first co me first se rved basis" principl e. In the case rhat more allowan ces are needed to satisfy a m assive presence of new entrants, every go ve m m ent has a ce rta in degree offreedom . Some gov ern m e nts, such as Italy and C erma ny, stated to buy o n the m ark et the needed allowan ce for the new entrants, Also , in th e case that the reserve is not fully used, governments are allo wed to choose wheth er to annul the remaining or not. The qu antity of allowance is susceptible to government decisi on s roo: in fact the best pra cti ce is to consider the best te chnology in use in order to assess th e new entrants allowances endowm ent.
At the same time closure provisions permit the EU Member States some degree of freedom. Closures that oc cur during a phase allow th e activity owner to retain th e allowance until the end of the ph ase when the government auth orize s it . Also, as in th e case of Germany, there co uld be a transfer of allowances between closing activities and new entrants to http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/10
foster th e establ ishment of ind ustries wi thin th e co unt ry.
MONITORING, REPORTING, VERIFYING " U
Every wo rk ing syste m need s to be re viewed to e nsur e its o peratio n and p ro vid e credibili ty . M on ito ri ng. repo rtin g. and ve rifying arc esse ntial m echanism s and hold particula r att enti on during the operati on of th e EU ETS . Their devel opment giv es opti ons flexibility to both in stallati on ;1I1d M e m be r Sta res. Th e g uideli ne, ar e de fined ill th e a n ne-xes IV a nd V o f t he D irecti ve 2003 /87 l Ee and focus o n th e baselin es co m easu rin g, the p ro vision for reporting. and th e requirem ents for veri fying. M ember States are resp o nsible for all the three acti ons. The E C is like a un biased su pe rinte nde nt: as well as wi th in o the r part s o f th e E U ETS fnuue work , its ro le is to ultimat el y e nsure rh.ir M ember Stares ap p ly th e' regulatio ns correct!y.
Iu the m oni toring p roc ess. the ro le of M ember States is to en su re that th e operato rs of ce rtai n specifie d act iv ities hold a gr ee n ho use gas em issio ns pe ru n r an d that th ey m oni tor and re po rt th eir e mi ssions o f g ree n ho use gases spe ci fied in rel at ion co th ose ac tivi tie s. Th e guidel in es o n m onitorin g a1' ,' based o n th e fuel usc, an d ca lculated usin g th e formula "/l cli,'-iry d.na >: Euussionlactor X Ox ulation iactor' wher eas activity d ura take acc o un t of th e kind o f fuel use d (no wadays. oxida tio n ( ICtor is still not co nsidered . since th e EU E TS cove rs o nly C02 e mis sio n'» .
M ember Sta res have to respe ct sev era l deadlin es, The e nd o f April is set to be th e deadline to su rre nder th e form er yea r allowan ces as show n in Fig ure 1. 2 . M ember States hav e to issu e allo wan ces by the end of Fchru ary eac h ye ar ill accordan ce w it h rh c final a llocatio n de c isions, o pe rate th e nati on al re g ist ry. and also have to p rodu ce' a re gul ar an n ua l rep ort to the Co m m issio n . The Comm ission establi shed to ado pt standardized or accep ted m ethods as g u ideli ne s for m on it oring an d reportin g; o f em issio ns, Moreo ver. M emb er Sta tes must ta ke m easures to coord inate rep orting re q u irements w ith allY exi sting re porting require m ents in o rde r to miniun ze th e repo rtin g burden o n bu sin esses. T he aim of th e ve rifica tion process is to add ress th e relia bil ity . credibi lity, and acc u racy o f moni toring sysrenis and th e re po rted da ta and in formation relating to e m issio ns. M ember Sta tes ar e res po nsible to e nsu re th e ve rificatio n foll o w ing th e an n ex V p ro visions a nd to sto p allowa nc e tran sfers from th ose activ ities w hic h d o not meet rh .... req ui re me nts o f an nex V . M ember States art' free to ch o ose a third party in order to veri fy th e' monito ring and reporting acc ording to th e requirement o f com pet ency settle d in th e anne x V .
T he C omm ission operates the Eu rop ean hub of the registry system , and prepares an an nual rep ort on the basis of Me m ber States reports. It closely follo ws the performance of, and reviews the ex pe rience with, th e E U Em issions Trading Sc heme . The Com missio n has undertaken a review o f th e monitoring and reporting whi ch is effective since 200R and w hich takes into aCCOU l!t th e experience of th e Phase I and of a stake holde r consultati on . The main changes in th e guidelines are for th em to be closer to th e secto r practices' way of monitoring and report ing th eir activiti es. In addi tio n, they need to be more align ed with rep orting mad e by M emb er States, whil e veri ficati on pro cedures of th e m onitoring and rep ort ing have been strengthe ned .
PRICE ANALYSIS
T he existen ce of a carbo n mark et is date d back to November 2003 though th e EU E TS began working in j an uary 2005. Between N ovember 2003 and J anu ary 2005 there had been a sharp oscillati on of th e price of allow ances co nt racts since at that tim e the Commissio n was still evaluating th e NAPs and therefo re un certainty over th e real number of allowances was set down .r" The price at the op ening in J anu ary 2005 W J S E8.38 raising to €21.10 at the end of the year. Spike of traded vo lume, 42 .9 million allo wances occ ur red o n April 2R, 2006 co incidi ng w ith th e deadline of allowa nce surre nder of installation (30 April) and peak p rice o f €30. One major result was th e clear ove ralloc atio n o n allowa nces o perated in the NAPs I. This lead to a progressive decrease of th e EU ETS allo wances (E U A) price in th e market falling from a E4 level at the beginning of the year 2007 to EO.03 in December. As seen from Figure 1 http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/10 
INSIGHTS OF THE FULL STUDY
The EU ETS is a particular case of emissi on tradin p firstly becau se it treats C 02 em issio ns whi ch are' a glo bal externality : emi tt ing in a ce rtain place' will afl e cr the rest of th e world since thi s com po u nd spre ads out hoino geneou sly in th e' atmosp here'. TIll s fact highli ghts the imp ortan ce of inrernarion al undertaking. be cau se the Eu rop ean effort in co ntrastin g glo bal warming co uld be thwart ed when other co unt ries w ould co ntin ue emitting G H G according to bu siness as usu al o peratio ns. A second major issue is the approa ch o n emissio ns reducti on : th e EU has chose n a quantity approac h (cap and trad e) rath er than a pri ce' app roa ch (taxa tio n) alrhough n1 a11 )' have been calling tor a better efficiency o f th e pri ce' alternati ve . The quantity approach sets 1l1an)' probl em s about allowan ce issuing am ong act iviti es: emissions data ser ies are needed but at th e same time there is a leakage o f track records at activity le vel. At the sam e tim e ;1 quantity approac h ensure th e final objectiv e. th e total actual emi ssion. since the cap o n emissions is fixed : this feature made the quantity appro ach preferabl e to th e price on e . Th e o u tco me a ll allo wances pri ce has seen a marked volatility. which has been making diffi cult the assessme nt o f the o ptimal act io n cho ices at installatious level. Com pared to the ex pecta tio n befo re laun ching th e EU E T S, the price result ed in a d epreciati on of allowan ces, So me lesson s have been learn ed fiom the first co nunitmcnt tim e period (the Pilot Ph ase) . The disconnect ion between Ph ase J and 11 becam e clear when it ca rne out that th e Pilot Pha se result ed in a allowances ov er allocation. The impossibility of banking allow ances acr oss the two ph ases pu shed the pri ce o f Phase I E UA s down to ze ro lev el. In th e case th at activities h,rd been allo we d to bank the' allowan ces surp lus, the occ u rred de p reciatio n wo uld have not tak en pla ce so dramati cally. Th e reasons w hy a co m pany de cid es to bank allowan ce~are essentially tw o . Th e first is th e case when expectati on tor future pri ces is for a high er level th an the current on e. The sec o nd is to offset un certainty over the future or ov er su pply, as for exam ple it co uld be the case of m ore stringent cap during th e thi rd pha se. B anking and bon-o win g then permits activiti es ro plan their in vestm ents and act io ns in the mark er
The European Union Emission Trading Scheme environ m e nt to a larger time extension stabilizi ng th e price and giv ing co nsistency to th e sco pe o f the EU E TS . Another lesson has been learnt du ring Pha se I: th e EU sho uld aim for a m or e stringent allowances allocation given the ov er alloc atio n of th e pil ot phase. This is what ha s actually been done for th e curre nt Phase II and it is going to b e done in the third ph ase. Also , th ere sho uld be a better future operation unde r allowances auctio n ing rather th an di stribution for free . The result o f free allo w ance distribution has been in so m e cases a so rt o f subsidy to so me of the ac tiv ities and this has caused the so called " w ind fall profits" within som e industri es. Economists usually argue that a full auctioning sho uld provide a better o pe ratio n and efficien cy of th e E U ET S. As resp on se, the Commi ssion established th at au cti oning is going to b e the rule starti ng from 2013 , and it will progr essively increase its sha re amo ngst the allowa nc es distribution methods. Th is kind of environm ent should make the allo wance m ark et m ore predict abl e and help inv estors in planning lon g term strate gy .
The EU ETS is integ rated within the flexible me chanism s of the Kyoto Proto col. Co nsequen tly , ea ch activity unde r th e EU ETS is allowed to get cred its as results of finan ced project under the COM. M ore precisely, a ce rta in amount of allo w ances deriving from C O M projects is permitted to co m ply with th e assign ed cap. Had th e imposed emissio n redu ct io n been quite low (i.e . o n ave rage some per centage points), th e undertaking of M ember State s was not burdensom e . So me of these co u nt ries ha ve b een allo w ed to use a co nside rable qu antit y o f C O M credi ts, w hic h ge ne rally are cheaper th an th e EUAs. AJI of th e activities under th e EU ETS have privileged C D M credits and th ey have m ade a full use o f them. What has happened is th at the emissions reduction needed to co m ply with the E U ETS has been in part produ ced o utside Europe, especially in C hina. Despite th e fact th at th e co m plianc e with the assign ed ca p is taking place , o n e could ar gue that the emi ssions redu cti on are not fully occu rri ng within E uro pe . At least, o ne co uld infer th at the European ter ritory driven em issio ns reducti on co m pa red to the " Business as U sual" scenario are not m assive.
The opportunity of finance carbon reduction pr oje cts combined to the high allowan ce pri ce volatility, as well as the low pri ce o f these on the market, are not good factors to new technologies d evelopment. This purpose is a maj or goa l o f the EU ETS , but the way th at th e EU ETS ha s been de veloping has not fo stered an y esse nt ial cha nge . T o understand thi s, o ne shou ld consider that a co mmo n ch o ice w as independently made ac ross the M ember States: they hav e o ve rburden ed th e ene rgy sector with the bulk of th e E U ETS. Therefore, the energy sector pl ays a key role within the trading schem e and its actio ns affect the o ngoing pr ocess of the whole system. C utt ing emissions in electricity produ ction can be easily implemented b y sw itc hing the fuel use fro m coal to gas. The potential o f ab atement is mu ch bigg er than what th e EU ETS cap is no wada ys requ irin g . In the light o f the fuel m ark et s tr end , it is more co nve n ie nt to electricity compani es th e co al to gas sw itc h rather than respo nding with a widespread R&D o n renewable energy in order to co m p ly with th e EU ETS assigned cap s. The EU ETS is still not a maj or actor into th e ren ewable energy techn ol ogies development, despite its aim is calling for. If the allowance p rice will result hi gher an d if inv esto rs will have to do with foreseeable forecasts of the Europ ean and international co m mi tm e nt o n carbon reduction, new green techn ologies development mi ght spr ead .
CONCLUSIONS
The EU ETS is still running in th e early stage o f its operation . The pilot Phase fini shed in 2007 and just one of five years of Phase II has b een accomplished. N owadays, any j udghttp://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/10 menr o n th e ET ETS has to be made in light o f this . N ev ertheless some lesson s have b een learnt and so m e credits have to be ackno wledged to th e EU ETS.
Firstly, a carbon m ark et like EU ETS had ne ver been created be for e . In (;Ict, in Europe there w as little knowled ge on how to crea te a carbon m ark et and there w er e only a few experts at th e beginning of the EU ETS impl ementation. In ge n eral, politi cian s did not kn o w th at mu ch abo u t emission trading, and econo m ic inter ests were limited .
Therefore , a first maj o r accomplishment is that th e EU has been th e first mover in cr eatin g an op erational em issio n trading schem e . T od ay, its share in th e glo bal market is by far th e biggest one. Lessons from the EU ETS can be appli ed to future clima te negotiati on s and th e EU , because o f its cu rren t le ading position, will playa central role in the international bargaining arena. The EU ETS has been a successful tool to fulfill the Kyoto requirements. D espite of w ides p rea d criticism over the EU ETS, sinc e man y flaw s exist, o ne sho u ld bear in mind it is succeed ing in respect in g its final goa l, th e EU co nu n itm en t to th e Kyoto Pr otocol.
There are also acco m plishm en ts ill o the r areas of th e EU ETS. First, the Pilot Phase lessons p rodu ced more stringen cy on Ph ase II NAPs sin ce a o vera llocatio n occ urre d during Pha se I. Banking and borrowing are go ing to be allowed acro ss future ph ases in o rde r to give more price stability in the future .
Second, even if a ce rta in abate ment occur red , it is d oubtful w hether the emissio ns redu cti on happened in Europe or n ot . A co nsiderable part o f emission s red uc tio n is du e to COM project emissio ns reductions whi ch take pla ce o utsid e Europe . The effectiveness of European territory driven emissions reduction under the EU ETS is therefore ambiguous.
T hi rd , th e lo w allowa nc es pr ice as well as th e high pri ce vo latility are likel y not to indu ce long period inves tu ien ts. Th ou gh it is its ma in purpo se, the EU ETS has still not succeeded in boosting new and permanent low carbon and energy effi cient technologies.
In co n clusio n, o ne sh o uld ackn o wl ed ge the E U ETS initiative in ex plo ring emission tradin g. Pilot ph ase lessons have produ ced some changes to wards a be tte r effi cie ncy of th e syste m in the actual seco nd ph ase and overall in th e up coming thi rd ph ase. Skepticism rem ains about th e effectiveness of foste ring perman ent low carb on and renewabl e ene rgy technologies.
END NOTES

